The stand-off over Bengal’s Special Intensive Revision, or SIR, tribunal portal is not merely a dispute about login credentials or software design. It has halted the processing of appeals against electoral-roll exclusions and inclusions since September 21, while exposing a larger institutional question: how far can an administrative digital system prescribe the way a quasi-judicial authority records and decides cases?
The 13 SIR tribunal judges hearing appeals in Bengal have refused to use the Election Commission of India’s new portal with Aadhaar-based credentials. They have also objected to a change that limits the documents they can record while adjudicating appeals to 13 specified categories. In a letter to the ECI, the judges said the portal had made them unable to upload their orders and had effectively rendered the tribunals “functionless”.
The immediate consequence is operational. No adjudication has taken place since September 21, according to the report. Appeals involving the inclusion or exclusion of names from the electoral roll therefore remain caught between a judicial process and the digital infrastructure intended to administer it.
The dispute matters because the portal is not functioning as a neutral filing cabinet. It appears, from the judges’ account, to determine the identity credentials required for access, the evidence categories that can be entered and the number of documents that can be selected while an order is uploaded. Those design choices have become part of the adjudication process itself.
The tribunals were created under an order of the Supreme Court in March 2026 to hear appeals arising from the SIR exercise. The tribunal judges say the Court had referred to 13 documents that could be considered, but had described the list as indicative rather than exhaustive. Their objection is that the new portal treats the list as a closed set, preventing them from recording other material that they consider relevant to an appeal.
That distinction between an indicative list and an exhaustive list is central. An indicative list guides decision-making while leaving room to assess additional evidence. An exhaustive list closes that room. If the judges’ description is accurate, the portal has converted an evidentiary reference point into a technical restriction, creating a gap between the legal authority of the tribunal and the options available in the software.
The earlier portal reportedly allowed judges to upload their orders in Word format and select whether an appeal was accepted or rejected. The new system requires them to identify which of the 13 documents were accepted during adjudication and permits the selection of up to five documents while uploading their judgments. The change may have been intended to standardise records, but standardisation becomes legally consequential when it prevents a judge from recording evidence that falls outside a predefined menu.
A judge cited in the report said that, in some cases, a Class IV or V pass certificate verified by the Bengal school education department had been accepted as corroborating evidence. The example illustrates the difference between a case file and a digital form. A tribunal may assess the relevance and reliability of a document in context, whereas a form can recognise only the categories that its designers have anticipated.
This is a familiar problem in public administration: the effort to make decisions more uniform can unintentionally narrow the discretion that the governing framework permits. Digital systems are often presented as tools for speed, transparency and consistency. But the system’s fields, dropdown menus and validation rules also encode assumptions about what counts as a valid record. When those assumptions are not aligned with the authority of the institution using the system, an administrative reform can become a procedural constraint.
The Aadhaar login objection raises a separate issue. The judges have said that requiring them to enter their personal Aadhaar numbers or other personal particulars to upload decisions amounts to interference with the functioning of a quasi-judicial authority. At a meeting on September 25, the 13 attending judges unanimously resolved that they would not share those details for uploading decisions.
The concern is not presented in the report as a general rejection of digital authentication. It is specifically about the relationship between personal credentials and institutional decision-making. The judges’ position is that they are acting as an authority established under the Supreme Court’s direction, and that the Election Commission’s administrative or technical arrangements should not determine how they exercise or communicate that authority.
Their letter also asks for the ability to correct clerical errors or apparent mistakes after an order has been uploaded. That request points to another design question: whether a system built around final submission understands that judicial and quasi-judicial records may require controlled corrections, clarifications or rectification of obvious mistakes. A portal that lacks such a mechanism can force institutions either to accept preventable errors or to depend on informal workarounds.
The underlying policy challenge is the institutional division of responsibility. The ECI operates the portal and manages the technical process. The tribunals, however, are responsible for deciding appeals. The judges argue that the authority of an appellate tribunal cannot be altered by an administrative decision or a software configuration. In effect, the disagreement asks whether the technical system serves the adjudicatory institution or whether the institution must adapt its legal process to the system’s limits.
This is especially important in a process involving electoral-roll inclusion and exclusion. The report does not provide the total number of pending appeals or quantify the citizens affected by the stoppage. It does establish, however, that the tribunal process has been unable to upload orders since September 21. For people whose names are under dispute, the delay is not simply an inconvenience: the outcome of an appeal determines whether the tribunal’s decision can be formally recorded and communicated through the designated system.
The episode also demonstrates why digital governance cannot be assessed only through the presence of a portal or the speed of data entry. A system may be technically functional while institutionally unusable. It may accept logins and documents, yet fail the more important test of whether authorised decision-makers can apply the rules they are required to follow. In such circumstances, a portal’s apparent efficiency can coexist with a breakdown in public service delivery.
The judges have asked the ECI to restore the earlier portal model, with modifications reflecting their concerns, within three days of receiving the letter. Their requested changes include removing restrictions on documents beyond the 13 listed categories, ending the requirement to share personal Aadhaar details and allowing corrections to clerical errors or apparent mistakes after upload.
The next step is therefore not only a software revision. It is a determination of how the portal will reflect the legal status and working methods of the tribunals. The available material does not establish the ECI’s response to the judges’ letter, whether the portal has since been modified or when adjudication will resume. Those developments will determine whether the dispute remains a temporary administrative blockage or becomes a wider test of how digital systems are designed for independent public authorities.
What the episode confirms is narrower but significant: when a public institution’s legal discretion is translated into software, the translation itself becomes part of governance. In Bengal’s SIR process, that translation has stopped appeals from moving forward. The resolution will depend on whether the final system is built around the tribunal’s authority, rather than requiring that authority to fit within the system’s predetermined choices.