LNG traffic through the Strait of Hormuz rose in September to its highest monthly level since the US-Israeli war on Iran began, offering a limited sign of recovery for one of the world’s most important energy corridors. But the increase does not amount to a return to normal. Vessel movements remain difficult to track, security concerns continue and the durability of the recovery will depend on whether shipping can remain viable through the winter.
Data from S&P Global Energy showed that 19 LNG cargoes passed through the strait in September: 13 from Qatar and six from the United Arab Emirates. The figure was higher than the 15 cargoes recorded in June, when a pact between the United States and Iran had begun to take effect. Kpler’s tracking placed the September total at 21 cargoes, also up from 15 in June.
The difference between the two tallies reflects the difficulty of measuring traffic in a corridor where some vessels conduct what are known as dark transits. These ships switch off their Automatic Identification System transponders, making their movements harder to observe. The tracking uncertainty is not a technical footnote. It affects how governments, energy companies, port operators and buyers assess the reliability of supply through the waterway.
The Strait of Hormuz is not merely a shipping route on a map. Before the war began on February 28, it carried roughly a fifth of global crude oil and LNG supplies, according to the report. That concentration gives the waterway an importance that extends well beyond the Gulf. Any sustained disruption would be felt through energy procurement, shipping operations and the infrastructure that receives, stores and distributes imported gas.
September’s increase therefore has two meanings. It indicates that some LNG carriers are moving through the strait despite the continuing security risk. At the same time, the volume remains far below the level that prevailed before the conflict. S&P Global Energy analyst Eric Yep said that if the pace were maintained into October, full-month transits could recover to 25% of pre-war levels. That estimate underlines the scale of the remaining gap: even a continued improvement would still represent only a quarter of the earlier traffic level.
The reported vessel movements provide a closer view of how that recovery is taking place. Three LNG vessels carrying cargoes from Qatar’s Ras Laffan export terminal reappeared outside the waterway in the second half of September, according to Kpler and LSEG ship-tracking data. Two were Qatar Energy-linked vessels, Al Kharaitiyat and Al Gharrafa.
Al Kharaitiyat was last seen inside the strait around September 22 or 23 before reappearing off India’s west coast around September 29 or 30. It was later travelling past Sri Lanka. Al Gharrafa disappeared from tracking data inside the strait between September 23 and 24 and reappeared west of India on September 30. The third vessel, Milaha Qatar, managed by Germany’s Pronav Ship Management, was last observed in the strait between September 17 and 21 before reappearing west of India on September 30.
Milaha Qatar was reported to be offloading its cargo at India’s western port of Hazira. That detail connects the international security situation directly to India’s built infrastructure. A vessel’s passage through a contested maritime corridor ultimately becomes a question for terminals, storage systems, distribution networks and industrial users onshore. The report does not provide information on the size of the cargo, its final destination after Hazira or its effect on Indian gas availability. It does, however, show how movements through Hormuz are linked to a functioning receiving network on India’s western coast.
The recovery also reveals the difference between nominal access and dependable access. A waterway may remain technically open while shipping through it becomes slower, more expensive or less predictable. The use of naval escorts, for example, can allow vessels to move but introduces additional operational costs. Yep said the continuation of shipping convoys under US naval escorts, despite their high cost, would be one factor affecting whether LNG transits can be sustained through winter.
For urban systems, that distinction matters because energy security is not determined only by whether a cargo arrives. It is also shaped by the reliability and cost of the chain that brings fuel to the country. LNG is handled through specialised ports and terminals before being connected to downstream users. When shipping becomes uncertain, the infrastructure may still exist, but its dependable utilisation becomes harder to guarantee. The supplied report does not establish any disruption to Indian city gas networks, electricity supply or industrial operations, so no such impact can be inferred from the September figures alone.
The central uncertainty is whether September represents a durable change or a temporary increase in movements. Yep identified winter as the key test. He said the continuation of LNG transits would depend on whether Iran resorted to more serious military escalation if higher exports through Hormuz were seen as a loss of leverage in controlling the strait. This places shipping activity within a wider security calculation: commercial traffic is influenced not only by demand and available vessels, but also by how the parties to the conflict interpret the economic and strategic significance of those movements.
That is why the September numbers should be read as an indicator rather than a resolution. Both S&P Global Energy and Kpler recorded an increase from June, but neither tally demonstrates that the waterway has returned to pre-war conditions. The S&P Global Energy estimate of a possible recovery to 25% of pre-war levels, if the September pace continues, points to improvement without normalisation. The Kpler count likewise shows more vessels, but remains a monthly snapshot shaped by tracking limitations and the use of dark transits.
The data also highlights the institutional complexity of energy corridors. Security authorities influence whether vessels can pass. Naval forces may provide escorts. Exporters such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates determine cargo availability and vessel deployment. Ship managers operate the carriers, tracking firms reconstruct movements and port operators receive cargoes after the maritime leg is completed. No single institution controls the full chain, which makes resilience dependent on coordination across security, shipping, energy and port systems.
The report’s references to Qatar Energy-linked vessels and Ras Laffan are significant because Qatar is one of the principal sources of the observed traffic. Thirteen of the 19 cargoes counted by S&P Global Energy originated from Qatar, while six came from the United Arab Emirates. This concentration means that the recovery is not evenly distributed across multiple supply sources in the data provided. It is particularly tied to the ability of Qatar-linked cargoes to move through the strait and onwards to consuming markets.
At the same time, the available evidence has clear limits. The two tracking agencies provide different September totals, 19 and 21 cargoes. Some vessel movements are obscured when AIS transponders are switched off. Qatar Energy did not immediately respond to a request for comment, while Pronav Ship Management declined to comment. The report therefore establishes an increase in observed or reconstructed traffic, but not the full commercial picture of contracts, cargo destinations, insurance costs, freight rates or delivery schedules.
Those limits are important for interpreting what the numbers mean for India. The appearance of Milaha Qatar off Hazira confirms that at least one reported cargo reached an Indian western port. It does not establish a broader increase in Indian LNG imports, a change in domestic gas prices or a direct improvement in urban energy supply. Those questions would require separate data on terminal receipts, downstream distribution and consumption, none of which is included in the supplied report.
The larger urban question is how cities and industries should understand infrastructure that is geographically distant but operationally essential. A disruption in a narrow maritime passage can affect systems hundreds or thousands of kilometres away, even when the immediate event occurs outside a city. Ports such as Hazira become the visible interface between global energy security and domestic infrastructure. Their role is not limited to berthing ships; they connect international supply chains to industrial, commercial and urban demand.
September’s LNG increase shows that the corridor remains usable, but it also shows why usability should not be confused with resilience. Traffic has recovered from the June level, yet remains below the pre-war baseline described in the report. Future monitoring will need to focus on whether the higher movement continues into October and through winter, whether escort arrangements remain in place, how tracking gaps affect reported totals and whether more cargoes reach Indian receiving terminals.
The evidence currently supports a cautious conclusion. The Strait of Hormuz saw more LNG traffic in September, with Qatar-linked vessels forming the largest part of the reported movement and at least one cargo reaching Hazira. But the recovery remains partial, tracking is imperfect and the security conditions that shape shipping have not been resolved. The next test is whether September’s increase becomes a sustained flow rather than a short-lived rise in a still-fragile energy corridor.