The United States’ decision to waive sanctions, restrictions and duties linked to Russian oil and gas has removed an immediate threat to India’s energy sourcing and exports. But the relief does not eliminate the deeper vulnerability exposed by the episode: India’s crude security increasingly depends on navigating sanctions, Middle East disruptions, US trade pressure and China’s ability to outbid Indian refiners for Russian cargoes.
US President Donald Trump announced the waiver through an executive order issued on Friday evening, days before several provisions of the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 were due to take effect. The legislation authorised the US administration to impose tariffs of up to 100% within 30 days on goods entering the country from the five largest importers of Russian crude oil or gas. It also covered countries that knowingly purchased Russian oil or gas after the law’s enactment, as well as countries among the five largest alleged facilitators of sanctions evasion.
Trump said he was waiving the application of the sanctions, restrictions and duties after certifying to Congress that doing so was in the national interest of the United States. For India, the decision changes the immediate risk calculation in two connected areas: the cost and availability of crude oil, and the exposure of Indian exporters to punitive US trade measures.
Russia has become India’s largest crude supplier since the start of the war in Ukraine, when European sanctions prompted Moscow to redirect oil towards buyers including India and China, often at discounted prices. The arrangement allowed Indian refiners to add Russian crude to their supply basket while responding to domestic energy demand. It also became increasingly important as India faced uncertainty around shipments from the Middle East.
The Times of India report said crude, liquefied petroleum gas and liquefied natural gas shipments through the Strait of Hormuz had been affected by tensions in the Middle East. The disruption encouraged India to diversify its energy sources more aggressively. Against that background, Russian oil was not simply a commercial option. It became part of the country’s effort to protect supply continuity when another major energy corridor was under pressure.
The proposed US tariffs threatened to turn that supply choice into a broader trade problem. A levy of up to 100% on Indian goods entering the US could have affected exporters across sectors because the US is India’s largest trading partner, according to the report. At the same time, sanctions that made Russian crude economically unviable could have forced Indian refiners to search for costlier alternatives during a period of supply uncertainty.
Manoj Mishra, partner and tax controversy management leader at Grant Thornton Bharat, described the waiver as significant relief for India’s trade and energy security. He said avoiding steep additional tariffs reduced the risk of disruption to energy sourcing while also limiting potential damage to Indian exporters. He added that the decision eased uncertainty in bilateral trade negotiations, although businesses would continue to seek greater tariff clarity and predictability for long-term export and supply-chain planning.
That uncertainty has been a recurring feature of India’s Russian-oil strategy. The report said the US had previously imposed a 25% penal tariff on India over Russian crude purchases, taking the total tariff burden to 50%. India continued buying Russian oil. After the US imposed sanctions on two Russian oil majors, however, Indian imports began to decline. Later, when the Trump administration lowered tariffs on India to 18% and removed the additional 25% penal tariff, Trump claimed India would stop buying Russian oil. India did not make such a statement, and the direction of its purchases remained unsettled as Middle East tensions intensified.
The episode shows how energy procurement has become inseparable from foreign policy and trade administration. A refinery’s sourcing decision is shaped not only by the price of a barrel but also by the possibility that a government may change the cost of importing it, restrict access to financial channels or penalise the wider export economy of the buyer. For India, this creates a planning challenge for refiners, exporters, shipping companies and public institutions responsible for energy security.
The waiver may also improve the operating environment for India–US trade negotiations. The report said the sanctions legislation had been seen as weighing on talks, while Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal had recently indicated that a draft trade agreement was almost ready. The executive order does not settle the wider tariff relationship, but it removes one immediate source of friction between energy policy and negotiations over market access.
The more difficult question is whether the waiver improves India’s physical access to Russian crude. The answer is not necessarily yes. Even as the threat of US tariffs recedes, Indian refiners may have to compete more aggressively with China. The report said Indian refiners expected Russian crude supplies to become tighter in October and November as exports declined and Chinese demand increased.
China is the world’s largest crude importer, while India is the third-largest, according to the report. A source involved in the sale of Russian crude told Reuters that Chinese buyers were booking cargoes in advance and paying firmer prices than Indian refiners. That behaviour can reduce the commercial advantage of discounted Russian oil for Indian buyers. If Chinese demand absorbs more available cargoes, Indian refiners may need to turn to more expensive alternatives even without a formal sanctions barrier.
The data point cited in the report suggests that Russian oil supplies were recovering in October and averaging above 2 million barrels per day. But an average flow does not guarantee equal access for every buyer. The relevant issue for India is the price, timing, grade and deliverability of cargoes available to Indian refiners after Chinese purchases and any restrictions affecting shipping, insurance or payments. The waiver addresses one layer of risk, while competition for physical supply remains.
This distinction matters for Indian cities and households because energy costs travel through the urban economy. Crude prices influence transport fuels, freight, manufacturing inputs and the operating costs of logistics and public services. The source report does not establish a direct change in retail fuel prices following the waiver, and no such outcome should be assumed. It does show, however, why energy security is an urban issue: the stability of supply affects mobility, goods movement and the cost base of city economies.
The institutional structure behind the decision is equally important. The US executive order changes the immediate legal exposure created by the Graham Act, while Indian refiners and exporters must continue responding to commercial prices, sanctions compliance and bilateral trade conditions. The waiver therefore does not transfer control of the supply chain to India. It creates additional room for Indian companies and policymakers to plan while leaving them exposed to future decisions in Washington, Moscow and Beijing.
India’s dependence on Russian crude has delivered flexibility, but it has also concentrated risk in a politically contested supply relationship. Middle East disruptions have increased the value of Russian cargoes, while Chinese demand has increased competition for them. US policy has added another variable by linking purchases of Russian oil to tariffs on the buyer’s exports. The result is not a simple choice between Russian and Middle Eastern supply; it is a constantly shifting energy basket shaped by geopolitics, shipping routes, refinery economics and trade rules.
The waiver confirms that the most immediate tariff threat to India’s Russian-oil purchases has been suspended. It does not confirm that Russian crude will remain cheap, that supply will expand, or that India’s wider tariff uncertainty has ended. The developments that deserve monitoring are the implementation of the executive order, the volume and price of Russian cargoes secured by Indian refiners, Chinese purchasing activity, Middle East shipping conditions and the progress of India–US trade negotiations.
