The Gujarat High Court’s stay on the confiscation of a loading auto rickshaw has placed a central question of administrative power under scrutiny: can a police or prohibition officer permanently take control of a vehicle allegedly used to transport liquor while the related criminal trial is still pending? The case is not only about one vehicle seized in Tharad. It tests how Gujarat’s prohibition enforcement system balances state action, property rights and judicial oversight.
The court stayed an order issued by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Tharad Division, which had confiscated a vehicle seized earlier this year. The vehicle’s owner, Premaji Vajir, challenged the order after lower courts declined to release the vehicle while the criminal proceedings continued. Justice M K Thakker issued notice to the Gujarat government and ordered that the DSP’s confiscation order remain stayed. The matter is listed for further hearing on October 22.
The dispute has emerged against the backdrop of changes to Gujarat’s prohibition law. The Gujarat assembly passed the Gujarat Prohibition (Amendment) Bill, 2024, which amended Section 98(2) of the Gujarat Prohibition Act, 1949. The amendment enabled the government to auction vehicles allegedly used to transport liquor and other intoxicants before the criminal case reaches its final conclusion, subject to court permission, according to the report.
That change altered the practical consequences of a seizure. Earlier, vehicles seized in prohibition cases could not be released until the court delivered its final order in the case. Under the amended framework described in the report, the government could seek to auction such vehicles during the pendency of proceedings. The policy objective is to prevent seized assets from remaining in storage for long periods, but its operation depends on who can authorise confiscation and at what stage of the legal process.
This is the institutional question at the heart of the Gujarat HC case. Seizure and confiscation are not interchangeable actions. Seizure places an article or vehicle under official control during an investigation or proceeding. Confiscation has a more permanent effect because it transfers ownership or control to the government. The petitioner’s case is that an officer may be empowered to seize a vehicle, but cannot independently confiscate it without an order from a competent court while the criminal trial remains unresolved.
The distinction matters because a seized vehicle is not necessarily proof of guilt. In the Tharad case, the loading auto rickshaw was allegedly used to transport liquor. The report says the quantity of liquor allegedly recovered was more than 20 litres, and this was among the reasons the lower courts did not hand over possession of the vehicle to its owner. However, the criminal trial was still pending when the DSP issued the confiscation order.
Vajir’s legal challenge relies on a 2024 Supreme Court judgment concerning the operation of the Gujarat Prohibition Act. Her counsel argued that the judgment clarified the difference between seizure and confiscation under the law. According to the submissions recorded in the report, Section 98 concerns articles liable to confiscation and the powers of the court, while Section 123 authorises seizure but does not give an authorised prohibition officer the power to confiscate a vehicle independently.
The petitioner therefore contended that the DSP had misapplied Section 98(2). Her argument is not that the state cannot act against vehicles allegedly linked to prohibition offences. It is that the legal authority to permanently take away the vehicle must be exercised through the procedure prescribed by law and, where required, through judicial approval. The High Court has not finally decided that question. Its immediate order is limited to staying the DSP’s confiscation order and seeking the state government’s response.
The case illustrates how a policy designed to strengthen enforcement can create a second administrative problem. Prohibition authorities need mechanisms to deal with vehicles that remain in police yards or other official custody while trials continue. Such vehicles may deteriorate, lose value and impose storage responsibilities on enforcement agencies. At the same time, an auction or confiscation before the criminal case concludes can create consequences that may be difficult to reverse if the accused is later acquitted or if the vehicle is not connected to an offence in the manner alleged.
The 2024 amendment appears to have been intended to address the first problem by permitting the government to auction vehicles used in ferrying liquor and other intoxicants before a final court decision, with court permission. The Gujarat HC proceedings now focus on the second problem: whether the authority seeking to confiscate the vehicle has acted within the limits of that framework. The answer will determine how the amended law operates in practice for police officers, prohibition officials, vehicle owners and courts.
The administrative chain is also significant. The vehicle was seized by Tharad police, while the confiscation order was issued by the DSP of the Tharad division. The petitioner’s objection is therefore directed at the authority exercised by an executive officer during an ongoing criminal case. The dispute places the enforcement hierarchy and the court’s supervisory role in the same frame: police may begin the process through seizure, but permanent loss of property raises a separate legal threshold.
For vehicle owners, the case highlights the difference between retaining nominal ownership and retaining effective control. Once a vehicle is seized, the owner may be unable to use it for work or transport even before the court determines the criminal allegations. In the case of a loading auto rickshaw, prolonged custody can also affect the economic value of the vehicle and the owner’s ability to earn from it. The report does not establish the owner’s liability in the underlying criminal case, which remains pending.
For the state, the issue is equally practical. Confiscation and auction powers can support enforcement only when the procedure is clear and legally sustainable. If an order is issued by an authority without the required jurisdiction, the action can be stayed, challenged or overturned. That can delay the disposal of seized vehicles and expose the administration to further litigation, even when the original objective was to make enforcement faster.
The court’s intervention also reinforces the role of judicial oversight in a system where executive agencies investigate offences and control seized property. The amendment to Section 98(2) may permit auctions in specified circumstances, but the High Court proceedings will examine how that permission interacts with the powers assigned to prohibition officers and the courts. The question is not merely whether the state has a confiscation policy; it is whether each step in implementing that policy follows the statutory division of authority.
The available facts do not yet settle whether the DSP’s order was legally valid or whether the vehicle can ultimately be confiscated or auctioned. The High Court has issued notice to the state government and stayed the order pending further consideration. The next substantive development is scheduled for October 22, when the court is expected to hear the matter again. Until then, the case remains a live test of how Gujarat’s amended prohibition regime handles property seized before a criminal trial has reached its conclusion.
