India’s agriculture is increasingly exposed to disruptions far beyond the farm gate. A discussion held by the Centre for Agriculture and Sustainable Management and Biodiversity (CASMB) in Pune on October 5 linked geopolitical tensions, fertiliser dependence, shipping disruptions, climate variability, weak logistics and changing city demand to the future of Indian farming. The central message was not that agriculture is facing one isolated crisis, but that several vulnerabilities are converging at the same time.
The presentation by retired civil servant Nanasaheb Patil placed farming within a wider economic system. Food production depends on imported fertilisers, energy, transport, finance, technology and access to urban markets. When any of these systems are disrupted, the effect can eventually appear in input prices, crop decisions, farm incomes and food costs in cities.
The discussion also raised a deeper question about India’s development model. India has recorded rapid economic growth, but the presentation argued that growth rates alone conceal the distance between India and larger economies in absolute output and per-capita income. The figures cited during the discussion put India’s economy at about $4.5 trillion in 2026, compared with $20.6 trillion for China and $31.8 trillion for the United States. India’s April-June growth rate was cited as 7.8 per cent, against 4.3 per cent for China, but the presentation stressed that a lower growth rate applied to a much larger economy can still generate a greater annual increase.
That comparison matters for agriculture because scale affects the capacity to absorb shocks. A country with limited fiscal, technological and industrial depth may find it harder to replace imported inputs, build reserves or protect producers and consumers at the same time. The presentation’s argument was that India cannot treat farm policy as separate from industrial policy, trade policy, port infrastructure, skill development and energy security.
### The import dependence behind farm production
Fertiliser emerged as the most immediate vulnerability discussed in Pune. Patil said India does not possess sufficient domestic supplies of phosphate and potash, while natural gas is required for urea production. Morocco was identified as having the world’s largest rock phosphate reserves, while major urea, ammonia and sulphur production facilities are located in the Gulf region.
According to figures presented at the meeting, India imports close to 10 million tonnes of urea annually, with about one-third coming from the Gulf. Ammonia imports are also heavily dependent on the region. The presentation said that before the disruption described in the discussion, between 50,000 and 200,000 tonnes of fertiliser moved out of the region each day. It claimed that this flow had fallen close to zero after the conflict began.
The same presentation said urea prices in the Gulf rose from around $400 per tonne at the beginning of the year to nearly $500 by March. It also referred to fertiliser plants in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh that had been fully or partially shut during March. These claims were presented at the CASMB discussion and are important because they show how farm production can be affected before a shortage becomes visible in retail markets.
India’s dependence is not limited to fertiliser. The discussion pointed to imports of palm oil, sunflower oil and peas, as well as dependence on China for several industrial inputs. It cited a $112 billion trade deficit with China in 2025-26 and said that more than 80 per cent of imports in over 71 electronics categories came from China. Lithium battery imports from China were placed at 83.6 per cent, while around 80 per cent of the active pharmaceutical ingredients used by India’s drug industry were also said to come from China.
These figures were used to make a broader point: the farm economy is connected to a much wider network of external suppliers. Fertiliser, fuel, machinery, batteries, cold-chain equipment, digital tools and transport all influence the ability of farmers to produce and sell. Import dependence is therefore not only a trade statistic; it is an operational risk for agriculture.
### Shipping routes are part of farm infrastructure
The discussion connected the conflict in West Asia to the cost and availability of essential goods. The Strait of Hormuz was described as a major route for global energy shipments, while the Suez Canal was identified as a route for a significant share of global trade. If ships are forced to take longer routes around Africa, the additional time, fuel and insurance costs can eventually reach importers, manufacturers and consumers.
For agriculture, shipping disruptions can affect more than fuel. They can delay fertiliser, edible oil, agricultural chemicals, machinery components and food exports. A port is therefore not merely a trade facility at the edge of a city. It is part of the infrastructure that determines whether farm output can reach domestic and international markets at a competitive cost.
This is particularly relevant for Maharashtra. The presentation argued that better connections between western Maharashtra and ports such as Jaigad and Dighi could help move grapes, pomegranates, mangoes and cashews to markets in the Gulf and Europe. It also criticised delays in completing the Mumbai-Goa road, describing the prolonged construction period as a barrier to regional economic integration.
The point is not simply that farmers need more roads. They need reliable links between farms, collection centres, processing units, cold stores, highways and ports. Without this chain, a farmer may produce a high-value crop but remain unable to deliver it while it is still marketable. The absence of cold storage and temperature-controlled transport can turn a logistics delay into a direct income loss.
### Climate risk is arriving alongside input risk
The CASMB discussion placed fertiliser disruption alongside the possibility of a stronger El Nino. The presentation cited a forecast that 2027 could become the warmest year on record, with the probability placed above 95 per cent. It also described India’s monsoon as increasingly irregular, with fewer rainy days, longer breaks and intense rainfall concentrated in short periods.
Regional variation was used to illustrate the problem. In the last week of September, Uttar Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Odisha were said to have received five to six times their average rainfall, while Maharashtra recorded a 57 per cent deficit during the same week. Such uneven distribution can create simultaneous floods in one region and water stress in another. It also complicates the operation of reservoirs, which remain dependent on rainfall for replenishment.
The significance for agriculture is that climate risk does not operate alone. A crop can be damaged by excess rain, while the next crop faces higher fertiliser prices or delayed supply. A farmer may therefore confront production risk and input risk in the same season. For cities, the consequences can appear as unstable supplies, higher food prices and greater pressure on municipal and state systems that support vulnerable households.
The material supplied for the discussion does not establish the precise future impact of these events on Indian food production. It does, however, show why the timing of climate and geopolitical risks matters. Multiple disruptions can reinforce one another even when each one begins outside the agriculture department’s direct control.
### From commodity crops to city-linked agriculture
Patil argued that India needs to expand the share of agriculture linked to higher-value and more regular demand. The presentation encouraged a shift from seasonal crops such as sorghum, pearl millet and soybean towards horticulture, dairy, poultry, livestock, protected cultivation and food processing.
The urban connection is central to this proposal. Growing cities require daily supplies of milk, vegetables, fruits, eggs and meat. Crops grown near urban markets can benefit from shorter supply chains, provided roads, cold storage, processing and market systems are available. The discussion referred to polyhouses for cucumber, coriander, fenugreek, capsicum and mushrooms, as well as orchards and livestock activities in areas around Pune.
This model could diversify farm income, but it also increases the need for institutions that can manage perishability and market risk. Fruit, vegetables, milk and meat cannot be treated like storable grains. They require collection networks, grading, refrigeration, processing capacity, reliable electricity and predictable buyers. If these systems are missing, a shift to high-value crops can expose farmers to new forms of loss.
The presentation also emphasised value addition. Jackfruit varieties developed by the agricultural university at Dapoli were cited as an example of resources that could be developed through processing and market access. The broader institutional question is whether agricultural research, farmer-producer companies, banks, district administrations and urban markets can work as one system rather than as separate programmes.
### The policy problem is coordination
Several examples in the discussion pointed to policy inconsistency. Sugar mills were encouraged to expand ethanol capacity and borrowed heavily for that purpose, but the presentation said that oil companies later preferred cheaper ethanol made from rice. This left both mills and farmers exposed to a change in procurement conditions.
The example illustrates how policy signals create financial commitments in the countryside. When producers and processing companies invest in response to a government target, a subsequent change in feedstock preference can affect debt repayment, crop choices and local employment. Stable policy is therefore part of agricultural infrastructure.
Finance was another missing link. The discussion said banks were reluctant to provide long-term credit to farmer-producer companies and proposed co-financing involving district banks and the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development. Such arrangements would matter because cold chains, pack houses, processing units and logistics facilities require longer repayment periods than seasonal crop loans.
The presentation also connected agriculture to industrial capability. India’s research spending was cited at 0.83 per cent of national income, compared with 2.7 per cent in advanced countries. It argued that training systems had not kept pace with electric vehicles, batteries, drones, robotics and solar energy. If rural economies are to adopt these technologies, they will need technicians who can install, operate and repair them locally.
This is where the agriculture question becomes an urban economy question. Villages supply food and labour to cities, while cities supply markets, services, finance and technology to rural areas. Weakness in either side of that relationship increases pressure on the other. A rural economy unable to generate employment can accelerate migration, while cities without affordable and resilient food systems face higher living costs.
### The bigger question for Indian cities
The Pune discussion shows that food security is not only about farm acreage or crop yields. It is also about ports, highways, energy systems, fertiliser plants, reservoirs, markets, financial institutions, research organisations and urban consumption. A disruption in an international shipping lane can affect a farmer through fertiliser prices; a road delay can reduce the value of an export crop; and a shortage of rural skills can slow the adoption of technologies needed by both farms and cities.
The evidence presented at CASMB supports a shift in how agricultural resilience is understood. Self-reliance cannot mean producing every input domestically immediately. It must also involve diversified suppliers, stronger domestic capabilities, better logistics, stable policies and the skills to maintain new technologies. The discussion leaves several claims requiring independent verification, particularly regarding geopolitical developments, trade figures and climate forecasts. But its central structural argument is clear: India’s farm future will be shaped as much by infrastructure and international systems as by decisions made within the field.
For policymakers, the developments to monitor are fertiliser availability and prices, port and road connectivity, the expansion of cold-chain capacity, financing for farmer-producer companies, the stability of ethanol and crop policies, and the availability of rural technical skills. These indicators will show whether India’s agriculture can move from vulnerability to resilience while serving an increasingly urban population.
